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This paper characterizes the social-welfare maximizing equilibrium of a \stochas-
tic partnership matching market", in which players paired to play a stochastic game
may quit to be costlessly and anonymously re-matched. Patterns of performance and
turnover in this equilibrium are consistent with the well-known \survivorship bias"
and, if partners form \meaningful rst impressions", with the \honeymoon eect". By
contrast, maximizing social welfare in standard repeated games with re-matching typi-
cally requires that players receive low payos at the start of each relationship. Welfare
and turnover comparative statics are also provided: higher partnership-states are as-
sociated with higher joint payos and, in the special case of an exogenous stochastic
process, with both higher joint stage-game and joint continuation payos as well as
longer-lasting relationships.
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1 Introduction
Players in an ongoing interaction often face uncertainty regarding the fundamentals of their
relationship. For example, an employer may be unsure about whether his worker will have
an incentive in the future to leave for another job. Or, rms engaged in a joint venture
may be unsure about future payos within their partnership. Such uncertainty can make it
dicult to sign complete formal contracts, especially if what might change in the relationship
is dicult to communicate to an outside party. At the same time, a long-lasting stable
relationship is crucial for the eective provision of informal incentives. If shocks to the
productivity of a partnership may cause it to end or be less productive in the near future,
players will have less incentive to work today, reducing relational gains and potentially
hastening the partnership's demise in a vicious cycle.
Given the option to leave one's current relationship to costlessly and anonymously re-
match, players are only willing to make cooperative sacrices if those who leave a relationship
face some endogenous cost of being re-matched. For this reason, in standard (non-stochastic)
repeated games with re-matching, maximizing social welfare requires that partners fail to
immediately achieve the full potential equilibrium benets of their relationship, such as by
burning money or enduring an initial \incubation period" with eorts and payos lower than
could be supported in equilibrium; see e.g. Kranton (1996) and Carmichael and MacLeod
(1997). In particular, social-welfare maximizing equilibrium play necessarily fails to be
renegotiation-proof. This paper sheds new light on this classic result, by providing a sucient
condition (\meaningful rst impressions") given which social-welfare maximizing equilibrium
play is renegotiation-proof (Theorem 5). Along the way, I will also establish new results about
joint-welfare maximizing play in complete information stochastic games with voluntary exit.
Each period in a given partnership, two players simultaneously decide how much eort to
exert after observing a partnership-specic state. \Eort" can be interpreted broadly, e.g.
to include relationship-specic investments. After observing eorts, the partners then decide
whether to quit the relationship and whether to pay voluntary \wages". The partnership
ends if either player quits or \dies", in which case each surviving player is costlessly and
anonymously re-matched with a new partner.
2The model imposes few substantive restrictions on stage-game payos or on the stochas-
tic state of the partnership. Notably, stage-game payos are assumed to satisfy increasing
dierences in players' eorts and the state, while the stochastic process is assumed to sat-
isfy a positive serial auto-correlation property that higher past states make higher future
states more likely in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance. However, no substantive
restrictions are placed on how eorts control the stochastic process. This allows for a rich
set of potential applications from labor to macroeconomics and organizational economics,
in which greater eort grows, depletes, or has a non-monotone eect on a payo-relevant
relational stock. For example, in a labor context, one could interpret the worker's (multi-
dimensional) eort as including work intensity as well as investments in rm-specic human
capital. The assumptions are suciently weak that the existing literature on comparative
statics in stochastic games does not apply. (See the literature discussion below.)
Analysis of the model is divided in two parts. In the rst part (Section 4.1), I derive
a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) that maximizes players' joint welfare among all SPE,
taking as given the players' outside options (Theorem 1). Joint payo in this equilibrium is
non-decreasing in the state (Theorem 2), but higher states need not in general be associated
with higher joint stage-game payo or higher joint continuation payo. Consequently, players
in higher states may or may not exert more eort, may or may not exit with lower probability,
etc. However, more comparative statics are available in the special case in which players'
eorts have no eect on future states. In this case, partnerships in higher states will enjoy
higher stage-game payos, higher continuation payos, and later stopping times in the sense
of rst-order stochastic dominance (Theorem 3).
In the second part (Section 4.2), I derive the maximal social welfare that can be supported
in equilibrium, within a \partnership matching market" with costless and anonymous re-
matching after partnership dissolution. If some player's partnership ends, whether because he
quit, his partner quit, or his partner died, he is automatically re-matched with a new partner
to begin the next period. This new partnership is assumed to be a \fresh start", in the sense
that (i) the stochastic processes driving stage-game payos are iid across partnerships and (ii)
players know nothing about their current partner's history before their partnership began,
3including his age, number of past partnerships, etc.1 Expected payos in a new partnership
generate outside options for each player should his current partnership end. The analysis
endogenizes the maximal joint outside option that can be supported in any equilibrium of
the partnership market, thereby closing the model (Theorem 4). Further, given an equal
exogenous ow of births and deaths, I characterize the steady-state distribution of histories
among active partnerships in the social-welfare maximizing equilibrium.
Patterns of performance and turnover in the social-welfare maximizing equilibrium shed
light on well-known stylized facts about the dynamics of relationships, the so-called \sur-
vivorship bias" and \honeymoon eect". The survivorship bias is a broad empirical nding
{ documented in employment (Topel and Ward (1992)), marriage (Stevenson and Wolfers
(2007)) and organizations (Levinthal (1991)) { that older partnerships tend to be more
productive and less likely to dissolve in the near future. The honeymoon eect is a less
general empirical nding { documented in organizations (Fichman and Levinthal (1991))
but not marriage (Stevenson and Wolfers (2007)) { that brand-new partnerships also tend
to be more productive and less likely to dissolve in the near future, relative to those in
\adolescence".2
The survivorship bias arises in the social-welfare maximizing equilibrium because part-
nership dissolution is triggered when the partnership-state falls below a threshold surface in
the state-space. Thus, partnerships that have lasted a long time tend to be those that have
received mostly positive shocks that made the partnership more protable and less likely to
end in the near future. On the other hand, in classic models of repeated games with costless
and anonymous re-matching, maximizing equilibrium social welfare dictates that players fail
to realize all potential equilibrium gains at the start of each relationship. Thus, new re-
lationships may in fact tend to endure an \anti-honeymoon" before emerging into a more
productive, established phase. (See e.g. Section 5.2 of Mailath and Samuelson (2006).) This
1If historical variables such as age could be observed, then market-wide welfare might be enhanced in
\old-maid equilibria" in which players who are not newly-born are shunned.
2By contrast, Stinchcombe (1965) argues that partnerships can be especially unstable when they are
young if, among other reasons, players are uncertain about match quality and quickly learn whether they are
a good match. This insight is supported by this paper's analysis, once the stochastic state of the partnership
is understood to reect what players have learned about partnership quality.
4paper qualies this well-known result, by providing a sucient condition { \meaningful rst
impressions" { given which equilibrium social welfare is maximized when players maximize
equilibrium joint welfare within every partnership. In that case, the honeymoon eect arises
in equilibrium due to a selection eect, just as in non-strategic models such as Fichman
and Levinthal (1991). Namely, partnerships that last more than one period are those that
generated suciently positive rst impressions.3
In the joint-welfare maximizing equilibrium, there is typically a range of states in which
partners exert zero eort but elect to remain together despite this failure to cooperate. Play-
ers endure such \hard times", rather than quitting, because of the option value associated
with waiting to exit. However, this option value does not only arise as usual from exogenous
variation in the productivity of the partnership itself. The option to exit later becomes more
valuable, in equilibrium, because of the endogenous variability of players' behavior.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The introduction continues with discussion
of some related literature. Section 2 then presents a self-contained and in-depth analysis
of a simple illustrative example with Prisoners' Dilemma stage-game payos. This example
highlights most of the paper's qualitative results and novel analytical methods in a setting
of some independent interest. Sections 3-4 then generalize the model and analysis to a much
richer setting that allows for more general stochastic processes and does not require many of
the special features of the example. Section 5 concludes with some remarks and directions
for future research. Some proofs are in an Appendix.
Related literature.
This paper synthesizes elements from the literatures on productivity shocks (e.g. Jo-
vanovic (1979a)), relational contracts (e.g. Levin (2003)), and repeated games with re-
matching (e.g. Kranton (1996)), in a rich but tractable stochastic framework.
Jovanovic (1979a) considers a model in which a worker learns over time about the pro-
ductivity of the match with his present rm and quits as soon as he becomes suciently
3Using a dating metaphor, one may expect a couple that goes on a second date to be very likely to go
on a third (if rst impressions are suciently more important than second impressions). However, in the
\adolescence" of such a relationship, break-up becomes more likely as negative impressions have time to
accumulate.
5pessimistic about the match. Consequently, workers who have remained longer at the same
rm are less likely to leave and more likely to be more productive.4 The key dierence here
is that partners face an incentive problem as well as a learning problem. Whereas the worker
in Jovanovic always enjoys the full gains from his current match, players here must work to
enjoy those gains and choose how to distribute them through voluntary wages. Levin (2003)
characterizes optimal \relational contracts" in a principal-agent context in which the agent's
cost of eort is iid. Unlike Levin (2003), this paper allows for two-sided incentives and
non-iid stage-game payos, and endogenizes players' outside options through a re-matching
technology.5
The analysis here conrms and combines key qualitative ndings from the literatures on
productivity shocks and relational contracts. For example, I show that performance inside
the partnership decreases with the attractiveness of players' outside options. This extends a
well-known nding of the relational contracts literature (see e.g. MacLeod and Malcomson
(1989) and Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994)) to a richer stochastic setting. Similarly, the
observation that partnerships can (under some conditions) exhibit the survivorship bias and
honeymoon eect is qualitatively similar to Fichman and Levinthal (1991)'s ndings about
rm performance and survival when productivity follows a random walk.
On the other hand, some of these same ndings are quite surprising when viewed from
the perspective of repeated games with re-matching (see e.g. Kranton (1996), Datta (1996)
and recently Eeckout (2006) and Fujiwara-Greve and Ohuno-Fujiwara (2009)). A key nding
of this literature is that social welfare is maximized when partners fail to realize all potential
equilibrium gains in their individual partnerships; instead, they burn money, forego protable
cooperation on the basis of payo-irrelevant information, or enduring an unproductive \in-
cubation" phase before transitioning to a maximally productive phase.6 The analysis here
4Also closely related is Jovanovic (1982), in which each rm's growth rate and survival depends on what it
learns about own productivity, and Jovanovic (1979b), in which similar eects arise as workers who choose to
remain in their current job make rm-specic investments to improve the future performance of the match.
5However, Levin's analysis is not less general, as he allows for incomplete information and imperfect
monitoring of eort.
6In an incomplete information setting, Ghosh and Ray (1996) and Watson (1999) provide a separate,
signaling rationale for \starting small".
6shows that such results hinge crucially on the assumption of non-random payos. When
partnerships exhibit initial randomness in the form of \meaningful rst impressions" (As-
sumption 6), social-welfare maximizing equilibria of the overall partnership market dictate
renegotiation-proof play within each partnership.
This paper also adds to the \dynamic games" literature in which a payo-relevant state
follows a known stochastic process.7 For example, a key insight in Haltiwanger and Har-
rington (1991) and Bagwell and Staiger (1997)'s models of collusion and the business cycle,
that collusion thrives at those times when the future state is most likely to be conducive to
collusion, is helpful for interpreting this paper's results as well. However, the focus here is on
how players' ability to dissolve their partnership and re-match interacts with their incentive
to exert costly eort. Also, by allowing for any persistent stochastic process, my analysis
encompasses both the iid case (as in Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), Ramey and Watson
(1997)) and the \positively autocorrelated" case considered by Bagwell and Staiger (1997),
among others.
Like this paper, Roth (1996) shows how to construct joint-welfare maximizing equilibria
in a dynamic partnership, using an algorithm in the spirit of Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti
(1990). Roth's model can be viewed as a special case of mine in which, among other things,
the initial state is non-random, the state is one-dimensional and follows a simple random
walk, and there is no feedback of eort on future states. Also, Roth does not account for
the important distinction between joint-welfare vs. social-welfare maximizing play. Indeed,
social welfare in his setting is not maximized by joint-welfare maximizing play when players'
outside options are endogenous via the option to re-match. By contrast, this paper char-
acterizes social-welfare maximizing play and provides sucient conditions given which such
play maximizes joint welfare within each partnership.
Recently, Chassang (2010a) and Bonatti and Horner (2010) have developed other theories
of cooperation dynamics. Namely, Chassang (2010a) shows how players \build routines"
in repeated games with incomplete information about payos, while Bonatti and Horner
(2010) develop a theory of dynamic public good provision given unobserved eorts and
7A growing and less closely related literature considers dynamic games in the presence of imperfect
information, e.g. Athey and Bagwell (2001) and Horner and Jamison (2007).
7uncertainty about the quality of the public good. In each of these papers, the underlying
environment does not change over time. This paper highlights dynamics that arise when
payos are stochastic, while abstracting from (important) issues of incomplete information
and imperfect monitoring.
More tangentially related is the existing literature on \stochastic games", especially those
papers such as Amir (1996) and Curtat (1996) in which sucient monotone structure is
imposed to generate comparative statics. However, most of these papers focus on equilibria in
Markov strategies, often proving uniqueness of such equilibria, whereas I consider subgame-
perfect equilibria (SPE) and focus on the SPE that maximizes joint welfare among all SPE.
Further, this literature imposes stronger assumptions than are needed here, in large part
because they prove stronger results such as uniqueness.
Lastly, although the option to exit plays an important role in the analysis, the literature
on so-called \option games" is not directly related. In an option game, players' payos
depend upon who exercises a real option (e.g. exiting a market) and when they do so, and
papers in this literature tend to focus on issues of strategic pre-emption or delay that arise
when players prefer to be the rst or last to exercise their option. See e.g. Grenadier (2002)
and Chassang (2010b). By contrast, my focus is to endogenize the productivity of the match
itself.
2 Dynamic Prisoners' Dilemma
This section provides a self-contained analysis of an illustrative and tractable special case
{ the \Dynamic Prisoners' Dilemma" { of the more general model of Section 3. Several
of the results here are corollaries of more general ndings presented in Section 4, but the
simplifying features of this example allow for proofs that are simpler and more intuitive. My
hope is that the analysis here will help build readers' intuition for the more general analysis
to be presented later.
Model. Two symmetric players play a repeated \partnership game" that continues until
some player quits or dies, after which any survivors are anonymously re-matched with new
8Work Shirk
Work 1;1  1   ct;1 + ct
Shirk 1 + ct; 1   ct 0;0
Figure 1: Stage-game payos at time t, while the partnership persists.
partners. Each player seeks to maximize his expected total (undiscounted) lifetime payo.8
Partnership stage-game. Each period t  0 of the partnership proceeds as follows. First,
the players observe state variable ct > 0, which I shall call the \cost of eort". Second,
the players simultaneously choose whether to work or shirk, observe these eorts, and re-
ceive Prisoners' Dilemma stage-game payos as in Figure 1.9 Third, each player dies with
exogenous probability (1   ), iid across players and periods. Should either player die, the
partnership ends and any survivor is costlessly and anonymously re-matched in a new part-
nership to begin the next period. (When a partnership begins, each player knows nothing
about his new partner's history.) Otherwise, with probability 2, both players survive and
simultaneously choose whether to stay or quit the partnership. If either player quits, the
partnership ends and both players are costlessly and anonymously re-matched. If both stay,
the partnership continues to the next period.
Stochastic process. The \cost of eort" Ct > 0 for all t and log(Ct) follows a random walk,
i.e. Ct
Ct 1 are iid. Further, the players observe a public randomization Z0  U[0;1] at the
start of their relationship, independent of (Ct : t  0). (The role of the public randomization
will become clear.)
Simplifying features of this example. Analysis of the Dynamic Prisoners' Dilemma
considered here is dramatically simplied by four features of this example that are all relaxed
8The analysis can be easily extended to settings in which players discount payos each period instead of
(or in addition to) facing the risk of death.
9Such payos arise naturally in a context in which players bear all of the cost of their own eort but share
equally the return to that eort. Suppose that each player generates a return equal to his cost when working
alone, but generates an excess return of one when working together with the other player. The payos of
Figure 1 then arise when the cost and return of individual eort is 2(1 + ct).
9in Sections 3-4. First, payos are symmetric and asymmetric play generates weakly lower
joint stage-game payo than symmetric play. (Joint payo is zero when one player works
and one shirks and at least zero when both players work or both players shirk.) Second,
the productivity of the partnership does not depend on the state variable. (Joint payo is
two when both players work and zero otherwise, regardless of the cost of eort.) Third, the
state variable Ct is exogenous, i.e. the distribution of the cost of eort in period t does not
depend on players' eorts in previous periods. Fourth, log(Ct) is a random walk. Because of
these simplifying features, some details of the model presented in Section 3 are not relevant
here. In particular, because of players' symmetry and the optimality of symmetric play, it
is without loss to restrict attention to symmetric equilibria with no voluntary transfers and
equal outside options for \males" and \females". To avoid cluttering the exposition here, I
will therefore make no reference to either \wages" or \gender".
2.1 Joint-welfare maximizing SPE.
Suppose that each player in a given partnership has an outside option worth v  0 should
he survive but the partnership end. (This outside option will be endogenized in Section 2.2.)
I begin by showing that, for any given v  0, the joint-welfare maximizing subgame-perfect
equilibrium (SPE) of the partnership game is characterized by a pair of thresholds.
Denition 1 (Work threshold). Both players \adopt work threshold cW" if, at every time
t, (i) both players work if ct  cW and (ii) both players shirk if ct > cW.
Denition 2 (Exit threshold). Both players \adopt exit threshold cE" if, at every time t,
(i) both players stay if ct  cE and (ii) both players quit if ct > cE.
Should both players adopt work threshold cW, standard real-options logic implies that
expected joint payo is maximized when players terminate their relationship according to a
threshold rule, namely, when they both adopt an exit threshold cE(cW;v) that depends on
the work threshold cW and the outside option v. Lemma 1 gathers together several useful
facts about this \optimal exit threshold".
10Lemma 1 (Optimal exit threshold). Suppose that both players adopt work threshold cW.
Joint payo is maximized when they also adopt exit threshold cE(cW;v) = (v)cW, where
(v) is non-increasing in v.
Denition 3 (Threshold equilibrium). A (cW;cE)-threshold equilibrium is a SPE in which
both players adopt work threshold cW and exit threshold cE on the equilibrium path and,
o the equilibrium path, both shirk and quit.
Proposition 1 (Joint-welfare maximizing SPE). Fix any outside option v  0. There
exists cW(v)  0 such that (cW(v);(v)cW(v))-threshold equilibrium exists and achieves the
maximal joint payo among all SPE. (cW(v) is the \optimal work threshold" and cE(v) =
(v)cW(v) is the \optimal exit threshold.")
Proof. Optimal exit given a work threshold. Suppose that the players adopt work threshold
cW, so that each receives stage-game payo one when ct  cW and zero when ct > cW.
By Lemma 1, joint payo is maximized when both players adopt exit threshold cE(cW;v).
Indeed, since both players receive identical payos when both adopt work threshold cW,
the exit threshold cE(cW;v) = (v)cW maximizes players' individual payos so that each
player is willing to quit i the state exceeds this threshold. Thus, if any SPE exists in which
the players adopt work threshold cW, then (cW;cE(cW;v))-threshold equilibrium exists that
achieves the maximal joint payo among all SPE in which players adopt work threshold cW.
Optimality of threshold SPE. Fix any SPE. Let W = fc : both players work with positive
probability at some time t, after some history, when ct = cg. Consider any time-t history
at which both players sometimes work and ct 2 W. Shirking when one is supposed to
work increases each player's stage-game payo by at least ct, after which that player enjoys
continuation payo (as evaluated immediately after time-t eort) of at least v.10 Thus, this
SPE must generate continuation payo after time-t eorts of at least ct+v for each player.
I claim that a (supW;cE(supW;v))-threshold equilibrium exists. Since both players work
whenever ct  supW, such threshold strategies generate weakly greater joint stage-game
payos than the original SPE while the partnership persists, in every state ct. And, since
the players' exit threshold cE(supW;v) maximizes their joint payo given work threshold















     
DOOMED
Figure 2: Summary of the optimal SPE of Proposition 1, for all v  0.
supW, players' joint payo from any on-path history in state ct is weakly higher than in
the original SPE, from any history in the same state ct. In particular, for all ct 2 W,
the players' joint continuation payo after both work at time t is at least 2(ct + v) when
these threshold strategies are played. Since the players receive equal payos, nally, each
player's continuation payo is at least ct + v and he has sucient incentive to work. This
argument applies to all ct 2 W, and hence by continuity to ct = supW. We conclude that
a (supW;cE(supW;v))-threshold equilibrium exists and that this SPE generates weakly
greater joint payo than the original SPE.
Players' behavior in the joint-welfare maximizing SPE of Proposition 1 is summarized by
Figure 2. Since outside option v is xed, the partnership state can be viewed as moving up
and down a vertical slice of this gure. When the region labeled \EXIT" is reached, both
players shirk and quit. Until then, both players work and stay when in the region labeled
\WORK" while both shirk and stay when in the region labeled \SHIRK".
Figure 2 illustrates some noteworthy properties of the optimal work and exit thresholds.
First, not surprisingly, there exists a critical outside option ~ v above which all partnerships are
\DOOMED", i.e. the players shirk and immediately quit regardless of how small their initial
cost of eort c0. Exit is ecient when v  1
1 2, but the threshold ~ v < 1
1 2. Intuitively,
the reason is that all partnerships operate under the \shadow of cooperation breakdown".
12Should there be a negative shock that will induce exit, both partners will exert zero eort {
and hence earn zero stage-game payos { in the last period of their relationship. Due to this
risk, players only remain in a partnership if cooperation generates sucient excess return
over the outside option.
\Hard times". For all outside options v < ~ v, the optimal work threshold cW(v) and the
\gap"
cE(v)
cW(v) between the optimal work and exit thresholds is strictly decreasing in v. (See
Lemmas 1-2.) This gap represents what one might call \hard times", periods in a relationship
when partners endure zero stage-game payos in hopes that cooperation will resume. As
the outside option becomes more valuable, players are both less willing to work and also less
willing to wait for their partnership to improve.
Partnership stopping time. Let T  denote the stopping time of a partnership, when
the joint-welfare maximizing SPE of Proposition 1 is played. The partnership may end due
to (i) death of either partner or (ii) voluntary separation. To distinguish these, let T die
i
be the time at which player i dies, T die = mini T die
i the rst time at which either player
dies, and T sep the rst time at which the partners would have separated absent death, i.e.
T sep = minft : Ct > cE(v)g. By denition, T  = minfT die;T sepg.
Since death is independent of separation, the hazard rate of partnership termination
Pr(T  = tjT   t) = 1   (1   Pr(T die = tjT die  t))(1   Pr(T sep = tjT sep  t). Since
each player survives each period with probability , Pr(T die = tjT die  t) = 1   2 for all
t. Since the players separate in the rst period in which the cost of eort exceeds the exit
threshold, (i) Pr(T sep = 0) = Pr(C0 > cE(v)) and (ii) Pr(T sep = tjT sep  t) = Pr(Ct >
cE(v)jmaxfC0;:::;Ct 1g  cE(v)) for all t  1. All together,
Pr(T
 > 0) = 1   












\Survivorship bias". Since players separate once the cost of eort rst exceeds an exit thresh-
old, partnerships that have survived several periods will, more likely than not, have received
mostly positive shocks that moved the cost of eort away from the exit threshold. This posi-
tive selection eect tends to make partnerships that have lasted a long time less likely to end
13in the near future.11 For example, suppose that log(Ct) follows a symmetric random walk
with motion log(Ct)   log(Ct 1)  U[ 1;1], and that c0 = cE(v) so that players are just
barely willing to stay in the relationship. Table 1 documents the hazard rate of separation
over time. For instance, conditional on partnership survival until time t = 4, the players
will choose to separate that period approximately 12:8% of the time. The survivorship bias
eect is present here, as the probability of separation decreases with partnership duration.
(The fact that the hazard of separation at time t is approximately 1
2t follows from symmetry
of the random walk; see Hughes (1995).)
Period 2 3 4 5 10 25
% partnership ends 25% 16:7% 12:8% 9:8% 5.0% 2:0%
Table 1: Probability of separation in period t, when log(Ct) follows a symmetric random
walk, conditional on c0 = cE(v) and on partnership survival up to that point.
\Honeymoon eect". Similarly, partnerships dissolve immediately if C0 > cE(v). Thus, the
set of partnerships that survive will be those for which C0  cE(v). As long as the cost of
eort varies suciently widely across partnerships while changing suciently slowly within
each partnership (e.g. C0 is atomless and
C1
C0  1), partnerships that do not dissolve at time
t = 0 will likely not dissolve for several periods. Similarly, in such settings, partnerships that
are productive at time t = 0 will likely remain productive for several periods.
Payos in the optimal equilibrium. Let 
eqm
(c0;v) denote each player's expected pay-
o in the joint-welfare maximizing SPE of Proposition 1 given initial state C0 = c0. Each
player's ex post payo is equal to the number of productive periods enjoyed during the part-
nership plus the outside option v if player i survives the partnership's demise (either as a






















11In general, the hazard of exit need not be monotone. For instance, suppose that log(Ct) is very likely
to either fall by slightly less than two or rise by slightly more than one, and that c0 = cE(v). Conditional
on both staying at time t = 1, the partnership is much more likely end at time t = 3 then at time t = 2.
14The optimal work and exit thresholds. The work and exit thresholds (cW(v);cE(v))
in the joint-welfare maximizing SPE are characterized by a pair of indierence conditions.
First, should the initial state equal the exit threshold (c0 = cE(v)), each player is indierent
between staying and quitting. The benet of staying is that each player will earn stage-game
payo one in each future period in which both players work. On the other hand, the benet
of quitting is that the player avoids the possibility of losing outside option v, should the
partnership end with his death (RHS of (4)). Similarly, should the initial state equal the
work threshold (c0 = cW(v)), each player is indierent between working and shirking. As
before, the benet of working is that each player will earn stage-game payo one in each
productive future period (LHS of (5)). On the other hand, the benet of shirking { and
thereby inducing the other player to quit and dissolve the partnership { is that one both
saves the cost of eort and avoids losing the outside option to death (RHS of (5)).
Let T(cE) denote the stopping time of the partnership when both players adopt exit
threshold cE. (So, T  = T(cE(v).) The optimal work and exit thresholds (cW(v);cE(v))




































Lemma 2 documents some useful facts about the optimal work threshold cW(v). (See Lemma
1 for more on the optimal exit threshold cE(v) = (v)cW(v).)








for all vh > vl.
Special case: worthless outside option. An interesting special case is that in which
players' outside option is worthless (v = 0). Without loss, one may assume that players never
voluntarily exit the partnership in the joint-welfare maximizing equilibrium (cE(0) = 1),
so the only question is when the players will be able to cooperate. Fortunately, the optimal
work threshold cW(0) can be characterized quite simply in terms of (i) the likelihood of












Figure 3: Illustration of Corollary to Claim 1.
death and (ii) the likelihood that the players' cost of eort will cumulatively increase over t
periods, for all t  1.
Claim 1. cW(0) =
P
t1 2t Pr(Ct  C0).13
Corollary. (a) cW(0) =
2
1 2 if Ct = C0 for all t. (b) cW(0) =
2
2(1 2) if log(Ct) =
log(Ct 1) + Xt for all t  1, where Xt  U[ ";"] iid and " > 0.
Proof of Claim 1: cW(0) = maxfcW : (cW;1)-threshold equilibrium existsg. Since the
partnership survives each round with probability 2 and both players work (shirk) when the
cost of eort is less (greater) than the work threshold, each player's continuation payo after




2t Pr(Ct  c










2t Pr(Ct  C0) = c
W(0) for all c0  ()c
W: (6)
That is, each player's continuation payo in any (cW;1)-threshold equilibrium equals cW(0)
when his cost of eort c0 = cW and exceeds cW(0) when c0 < cW. In particular, a (cW;1)-
threshold equilibrium exists for all cW  cW(0) but not for any cW > cW(0).
\Discontinuity" in maximal SPE payos.14 The corollary to Claim 1 may be surprising at
rst, since the range of states in which cooperation can be supported in SPE is discontinuous
13This result does not depend on the fact that log(Ct) is a random walk. cW(0) =
P
t1 2t Pr(Ct  C0)
(and the joint-welfare maximizing SPE is a threshold equilibrium) as long as (Ct : t  0) is an exogenous
stochastic process with the \persistence" property that Pr(Ct+1 > zjCt = c) is non-decreasing in c for all t
and all z, including the case of iid costs.
14The discontinuity of the optimal work threshold documented here hinges on the fact that there are
nitely many actions. If one enriches the model to allow a continuum of eorts et 2 [0;1], then there need
not be any such discontinuity. For instance, suppose that stage-game payos take the form it(eit;ejt) =
16in the \speed" "  0 at which the cost of eort evolves over time (Figure 3). In fact, this
result is quite intuitive. When the cost of eort is exactly at the work threshold, players
anticipate that they will only be able to cooperate in those future periods when the cost
of eort is not greater than today. When the cost of eort does not change, it is obviously
certain not to be greater than today. On the other hand, when the cost of eort follows
a symmetric stochastic process, future costs are equally likely to be greater or less than
today's cost. This shrinks by half the future value of the relationship, regardless of the
speed at which the players' cost of eort changes over time. Consequently, cooperation can
only be credibly sustained given cost of eort that is half as large.
2.2 Social-welfare maximizing equilibrium with re-matching
Players' outside option v is simply their ex ante expected equilibrium payo in a new part-
nership. Thus, maximizing ex ante social welfare is equivalent to maximizing players' en-
dogenous outside option.
Outside option v can be \generated by SPE play" if there exists a SPE of the partnership
game given outside option v in which each player's ex ante expected payo from a new






denotes each player's ex ante expected payo
in the joint-welfare maximizing SPE of Proposition 1, given outside option v. Thus, an



















is an upper bound on the outside option that can be generated by SPE play.
Ecient benchmark. In the Dynamic Prisoners' Dilemma example considered here, play-
ers' joint stage-game payo each period equals two should both work and equals zero should
one or both shirk, regardless of the state variable ct. (See Figure 1.) In particular, social
welfare is maximized when all players work and stay in their current partnership until parted




if eit < ejt, and it(eit;ejt) =  jt(eit;ejt)
if eit > ejt. The joint-welfare maximizing SPE species symmetric eort at every history that is both weakly
decreasing in ct and continuous in the speed parameter ".
17by death, at which point any \widows" re-match and work in their new relationship, and so











representing the \ecient outside option". More generally, for any xed outside option
v  veff, social welfare is maximized when players always work and stay in their current
relationship, in which case each player enjoys expected lifetime payo

eff(v) = 1 + (1   )v + 
2
eff(v) =
1 + (1   )v
1   2 : (9)
(Each player gets continuation payo zero upon death with probability (1   ), v upon
being widowed with probability (1   ), and eff(v) should both players survive and the
partnership continue. Note that eff  
veff
= veff and eff(v) > v for all v < veff.)
The ecient outside option veff cannot be generated by SPE play. Indeed, both players
shirk and the partnership is certain to end at time t = 0 in all SPE of the partnership game,
given any outside option v  veff. More precisely, 
eqm
(c0;v) = 0 for all c0 > 0 and all
v  veff so that E[
eqm
(C0;veff)] = 0 < veff. (The proof of this claim is straightforward
and omitted.) Thus, v < veff.
Achieving the upper bound v. Proposition 2 shows that the upper bound outside option
v can be generated by SPE play. (There are other sorts of SPE that also generate the upper
bound outside option; see the discussion after Proposition 3.)
Proposition 2. Outside option v can be generated by SPE play, in a SPE whose path of





both players shirk and quit at time t = 0; (ii) otherwise, play proceeds as in the joint-welfare
maximizing SPE of Proposition 1 given outside option v.
Proof. First, since shirking and quitting at time t = 0 is a SPE, the specied path of play
in fact arises in a SPE of the partnership game given outside option v. Let b eqm(c0;z0;v)
denote each player's interim expected payo when starting a new partnership in which this
equilibrium will be played, given initial cost of eort c0 and public randomization realization




eqm(C0;v)] v denote the probability with which the













This completes the proof.






> v, the upper
bound outside option v is generated by SPE play in which players fail to realize all of the
potential equilibrium gains from their relationship. Instead of immediately beginning a fully
productive partnership, these players sometimes shirk and quit on the basis of a payo-
irrelevant public randomization. Such play is not renegotiation-proof, since other SPE exist
in which both players immediately work and both receive strictly higher payos. This failure
of renegotiation-proofness is an important feature of classic models of non-stochastic repeated
games with re-matching (see e.g. Kranton (1996) and Carmichael and MacLeod (1997)).
To induce players to work in such models, players who shirk and then quit to start a new
partnership must be punished in some way. However, since players are assumed anonymous in
each new partnership, it is impossible to punish past behavior directly. To deter exploitative
behavior, some \friction" must therefore be introduced that makes new partnerships less
valuable than existing partnerships. As long as new and existing partnerships have identical
equilibrium productive possibilities, any such friction { necessary to maximize equilibrium
social welfare in the matching market as a whole { must take the form of some failure to
maximize joint welfare within at least some new partnerships.
One of the main contributions of this paper is to provide conditions under which this con-
ict between social-welfare and joint-welfare maximization disappears in stochastic repeated
games with re-matching. When equilibrium productive possibilities vary from partnership
to partnership { whether because partnerships dier at the start or because \things change"

















19during the life of a partnership { new partnerships may dier from existing partnerships
because of a selection eect. In particular, players in a suciently attractive existing part-
nership will have ample incentive to work, in order to avoid being tossed back into the
matching market and a less desirable new partnership. In the context of the Dynamic Pris-
oners' Dilemma, Proposition 3 establishes that payo-relevant variation known by players at
the start of each partnership { \rst impressions" that take the form of an atomless initial
cost of eort C0 { is sucient to eliminate all conict between social-welfare maximization
and joint-welfare maximization. (Theorem 5 establishes a closely-related result in a more
general setting.)






= v and outside option







is each player's ex ante expected payo when both adopt the optimal





























































and T(cE) denotes the stopping time of the partnership given exit threshold cE. Since C0 is
atomless and log(Ct) follows a random walk, the ex ante distribution of Ct is atomless for
all t. Thus, all probability terms in (11) are continuous in both cE and cW. (Recall from
(2) that Pr(t = T(cE)jt  T(cE)) = 1 2 Pr
 
Ct  cEjmaxfC0;:::;Ct 1g  cE
. Continuity
of the probability terms in (11) then follows from the fact that C0;:::;Ct atomless implies
Ctj(maxfC0;:::;Ct 1g  cE) is atomless for all t and all cE.) Thus, S(cW;cE;v) is continuous
in cW;cE, as well as obviously continuous in v. Next, recall that cW(v) is continuous in v







= supcE0 S(cW(v);cE;v) is continuous in v. This completes the proof.
20Example 1 shows that, without an atomless initial state as in Proposition 3, it may
not be possible to generate outside option v by joint-welfare maximizing SPE play. By
contrast, Example 2 provides a concrete illustration of how outside option v is generated by
joint-welfare maximizing SPE play given an atomless initial state.
Example 1. Consider the simplest scenario of an unchanging, non-stochastic repeated game,
i.e. Ct = C0 for all t and Pr(C0 = c) = 1 for some c > 0. Dene v implicitly by
eff(v) = v + c
2. Given outside option v, each player is indierent when the other
player works between (i) working and staying given that both players will work and stay
until parted by death or (ii) shirking and quitting. (Shirking induces the other player to
dissolve the partnership with probability 2, when it would have otherwise survived. Thus,
a \penalty" of c
2 next period in a new partnership is just sucient to induce players to work
in their current relationship.) Thus, when v = v, a SPE exists in which both players work




= eff(v) > v. By contrast,
given any outside option v > v, all SPE of the partnership game are such that both players




= v < v for
all v > v, and v = v. Since joint-welfare maximizing play generates payo eff(v) > v,
outside option v can only be generated by SPE that \wastes" some surplus that could have
been achieved in equilibrium. This can be seen in Figure 4, where the surplus that must be
wasted equals the dierence eff(v)   v.
Example 2. Consider now the next-simplest scenario of an unchanging repeated game with
an atomless initial state, i.e. Ct = C0 for all t and C0 atomless. Each player strictly prefers




then each player's present gain from shirking outweighs the \penalty" of needing to start
a new relationship. (See the discussion in Example 2.) On the other hand, given any
c0  2  
eff(v)   v

, a SPE exists in which both players work and stay until parted by
death, for realized payo (c0;v) = eff(v). In other words, the optimal work threshold





1 2 and (ii) the optimal exit threshold cE(v) = cW(v).





































































= v and the maximal
equilibrium outside option v is generated by joint-welfare maximizing SPE play that proceeds
as follows. At the start of their relationship, partners observe their match-specic cost of
eort c0. If c0  cW(v), then these partners work and stay until parted by death; otherwise,
the players exert no eort, dissolve their partnership at the rst opportunity, and seek out
a new partner. This \dating" process continues for each player until he nds a suciently
attractive mate, or dies trying.
Further discussion. The conict between social-welfare maximization and joint-welfare
maximization in Example 1 arises from an underlying discontinuity of the maximal equilib-
rium payo 
eqm
(c;v) with respect to the outside option v. In particular, lim"!0 
eqm
(c;v+
") = v < v < eff(v) = 
eqm
(c;v); see Figure 4. Generating outside option v therefore
requires that players fail to realize eff(v)   v > 0 in potential equilibrium gains. More
intuitively, suppose for the sake of contradiction that all players were to work in the rst
22period of every partnership in Example 1, as is possible in equilibrium given outside option
v. Each player would then strictly benet by becoming a \serial shirker", who shirks and
quits in a succession of partnerships for stage-game payo 1+ c every period. To deter such
exploitative behavior, at least some partnerships must fail to maximize equilibrium joint
surplus.
In settings such as Example 1, there can be several distinct ways by which to generate
outside option v in equilibrium. Yet all such approaches share one crucial feature: each
player faces an endogenous \switching cost" should he quit his current partnership and seek
a new match. Such switching costs are essential to provide equilibrium incentives to work
in the current match. Consider an augmented version of Example 1 in which, at the start
of each partnership, players (i) observe a public randomization (as here) and (ii) have an
opportunity to \burn money" publicly. Three very dierent sorts of equilibria generate
outside option v in this augmented example.
 \Burn money." At the start of period t = 0, each player burns money equal to c
2. As
long as both burn this amount of money, play proceeds as in the joint-welfare maxi-
mizing SPE, with both players working and staying until parted by death. Otherwise,
both players shirk and quit immediately. Burning c
2 in one's next partnership deters
players from shirking in their current relationship, by making established partnerships
worth c
2 more than new partnerships. Since each partnership survives with probabil-
ity 2 each period, this premium is just sucient to deter players from shirking and
leaving for a new match. Consequently, players have an incentive to work and stay in
each partnership until parted by death.
 \Incubation period." Both players shirk for S periods, after which they transition to
joint-welfare maximizing SPE play. The \incubation period" S is chosen so that each
player would be willing to pay c
2 in order to transition immediately to joint-welfare
maximizing SPE play at time t = 0.16
16S may depend on the public randomization, but it suces to restrict attention to support of the
form supp(S) = fs;s + 1g for some s  0. In this case, players always prefer to remain in their current
relationship, rather than leave to start a new one. (Once players with a (s + 1)-period incubation have
23 \Dating." If the public randomization exceeds a threshold , then play immediately
proceeds according to the joint-welfare maximizing SPE; otherwise, both players shirk
and quit. I refer to this sort of equilibrium as \dating" since players engage in a
sequence of unproductive, one-period relationships until they nd a \mate" with whom
they immediately enter into a fully productive match. Unlike the burning-money and
incubation equilibria, players in the dating equilibrium dissolve relationships on the
equilibrium path of play. However, as in these other equilibria,  is chosen so that
each player would be willing to pay c
2 in order to play the joint-welfare maximizing
SPE with the rst partner they meet.
While there can be many sorts of equilibria that generate the maximal equilibrium outside
option v when the initial state C0 fails to be atomless, Proposition 3 shows that only one
sort of equilibrium generates v when C0 is atomless { the \dating" equilibrium. (See also
Example 2.) This is quite intuitive, since dating not only imposes an endogenous switching
cost through a costly search process { just as burning money or an incubation period impose
endogenous costs associated with starting a new partnership { but also serves a sorting
function whereby players only \mate" with a suciently attractive partner.
Further, since partnerships are dierentiated by match-quality { \good" partnerships are
those with cost of eort less than the work threshold { players have sucient incentive to
work in good partnerships without the need to burn money or otherwise fail to realize all
potential equilibrium gains in such partnerships. Fear of being tossed back onto the \dating
market" is sucient to induce players in good partnerships to work. On the other hand, in
bad partnerships, there does not exist any SPE in which either player works, and shirking
and quitting to try a new date maximizes the players' equilibrium joint payo.
3 More General Model
The model has two parts: a \partnership game" played by two asymmetric players, and a
\partnership matching market", which generates outside options in the partnership game by
endured one period, they prefer waiting s more periods rather than starting a new partnership in which they
will have to wait at least s more periods.)
24allowing players to anonymously re-match with a new partner should their current partner-
ship end. Each player dies with exogenous probability (1 ) each period, iid across periods,
and seeks to maximize expected total lifetime payos. Likewise, each partnership ends when-
ever either player dies or quits, in which case each surviving player starts a partnership game
with a new partner.
Note on notational shorthand. To improve clarity and shorten equations, I have adopted
several notational conventions throughout the paper. First, random variables are capitalized
while realizations are in lower case. Second, variables specic to a player and time have two
subscripts, e.g. eit for player i's eort in period t of the partnership. Vectors of such variables
for all players at one time t are unbolded with one subscript, e.g. et = (eit;ejt), while those
for all players at all times no later than t are bolded with one subscript, e.g. et = (e0;:::;et).
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Figure 5: Timing of the partnership stage-game in period t = 0;1;2;:::
Partnership game. Each period t = 0;1;2;::: of a partnership proceeds as follows; see
Figure 5.17 First, a payo-relevant state xt 2 Xt = supp(Xt) is realized and publicly ob-
served. (Xt;) is a partially ordered set. Second, each player i simultaneously decides what
eort eit 2 Eit to exert, where eorts may control the stochastic process (Xt : t  0). Eorts
are then publicly observed and each player i receives stage-game payo it(et;xt). (Eit;) is
a partially ordered, nite set having minimal element \0".
Assumption 1 (Stage-game payos). For each player i, it(et;xt) is weakly decreasing in eit
17\Time" t captures the duration of a partnership, not any notion of real time in the partnership market.
See Assumption 5.
25and weakly increasing in ejt, and it(0;0;xt) = 0 for all xt. Further, joint payo t(et;xt)
is uniformly bounded.18







t )   it(eL
t ;xH
t )  it(eH
t ;xL
t )   it(eL
t ;xL
t ).
Denition 4 (Cost of eort). Let cit(et;xt) = sup~ eit (it(~ eit;ejt;xt)   it(et;xt)) denote each
player's \cost of eort eit" when player j exerts eort ejt at time t in state xt.
By Assumption 1, each player has a weakly dominant strategy to exert zero eort in each
eort stage-game, so the cost of eort ct(et;xt) = it(0;ejt;xt)   it(et;xt). By Assumption
2, x0
t  xt implies
it(et;x
0
t)  it(et;xt) for all et (12)
ct(et;x
0
t)  ct(et;xt) for all et (13)
for all et. That is, stage-game payos are weakly increasing in the state and players' incentive
to exert less eort is weakly decreasing in the state. (Increasing dierences implies (12) when
we set eH
t = et and eL
t = (0;0) and implies (13) when we set eH
t = et and eL
t = (0;ejt).)
Third, each player dies with exogenous probability (1 ), iid across players and periods.
Should both players survive, each then simultaneously decides whether to stay or quit the
partnership. The partnership ends if either quits or if either dies. If so, each surviving player
i receives an outside option having value vi  0. Otherwise, the partnership remains active
in period t + 1.
Utility is assumed to be transferable, and players can make voluntary wage transfers to
one another at any time. However, I will show that it is without loss to restrict attention to
equilibria in which players pay wages each period only in the form of \retention bonuses",
after and only if both players stay (Lemma 3).
Stochastic process in each partnership. The stochastic process (Xt : t  0) has the
property that future states are more likely to be higher when the current state is higher,
18The analysis extends easily to settings in which joint payo is not bounded (as when productivity follows
a random walk), as long as the maximum feasible expected lifetime joint payo is nite from every history.
26a serial auto-correlation property that I will refer to as \persistence". Two denitions are
needed to make this precise.
Denition 5 (Increasing subset). Let (Z;) be any partially-ordered set. Y  Z is an
\increasing subset of Z" if a1 2 Y, a2 2 Z, and a2  a1 implies a2 2 Y.
Denition 6 (Generalized rst-order stochastic dominance19). Let A1;A2 be random vari-
ables with support in partially ordered set (Z;). A1 \rst-order stochastic dominates"
(FOSD) A2 if Pr(A1 2 Y)  Pr(A2 2 Y) for all increasing subsets Y  Z.
Assumption 3 (Persistence). x0
t  xt implies Xt+1j(x0
t;xt 1;et) FOSD Xt+1j(xt;xt 1;et)
for all xt 1;et.
Finally, it will be convenient to assume that partners have access to a public randomiza-
tion at the start of their relationship. (Assumption 4 simplies the characterization of the
maximal social welfare that can be supported in equilibrium. See the discussion below.)
Assumption 4 (Public randomization). X0 = (Y0;Z0) where Z0  U[0;1] is independent
of (Y0;Xt : t  1) and payo-irrelevant.
Partnership market. Players' outside options are generated endogenously from their
ability to start a new partnership, within the following context.
Matching and re-matching. There is a unit mass of atomless players, half \male" and half
\female" who are paired to play the partnership game, with an equal ow of (1   ) births
and deaths each period.20 Any player who is newly-born or whose partnership ended in
the previous period (whether due to the death of a partner or due to endogenous exit) is
automatically and costlessly matched with a new partner. Further, each such match is a
\fresh start" in two senses. First, players know nothing about their current partner's history
before their partnership, including his age, number of past partnerships, and so on. Second,
19When Z = R, this condition reduces to the familiar requirement that Pr(A1  z)  Pr(A2  z) for all
z 2 R. There is more than one natural way to generalize FOSD to multi-dimensional settings, some more
restrictive than the notion used here. See e.g. Stoyan and Daley (1983).
20Gender captures the possibility that certain players may be matched and re-matched into specic roles,
e.g. buyer and supplier, worker and rm, entrepreneur and investor.
27players' history before the current partnership began has no impact on the state of that
partnership. (In particular, Assumption 5 implies that partnerships are iid.)
Assumption 5 (Fresh start). The distribution of Xt depends (only) on partnership duration
t, the history of states in the current partnership, and the history of eorts in this partnership.
Solution concept. The solution concept is subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) in each
partnership game, with the extra requirement that players' outside options arise endoge-
nously as the expected present value of starting a new partnership in which that SPE will
be played. In particular, for a given SPE of the partnership game with given outside options
v = (v1;v2), let E [
eqm
i0 (X0;v)] denote player i's expected equilibrium payo when starting
a new partnership at time t = 0.
Denition 7 (Partnership-market equilibrium). A \partnership-market equilibrium" con-
sists of a SPE of the partnership game and a prole of outside options v = (v1;v2) such
that
vi = E [
eqm
i0 (X0;v)] for i = 1;2: (14)
Discussion of Assumptions 3-5: By Assumption 3, the partnership is weakly more likely
to transition to a higher state tomorrow from a higher state today, holding xed the history
of players' eorts. The fact that no assumptions are made on how eorts impact future
states allows for great exibility, e.g. the model can accommodate settings in which eort
grows, depletes, or has a non-monotone eect on a payo-relevant stock. On the other hand,
Assumption 3 does rule out a variety of potential applications in which payos are stochastic
but not persistent. For instance, suppose that Xt = flow;highg for all t as in Bagwell and
Staiger (1997). Assumption 3 fails in the case of negative serial auto-correlation.
Here are some simple examples of state processes (Xt : t  0) satisfying Assumption 3. In
each case, Xt  RK. Examples (A-C) are exogenous Markov processes, (D) is a non-Markov
exogenous process, (E) is a non-trivially controlled process.
(A) Xt are iid.
28(B) Xt reverts to mean , e.g. Xt =  + (1   )Xt 1 + "t, where "t are iid mean zero.
(C) g(Xt) is a random walk on RK, where g : RK ! RK is any non-decreasing function
relative to the usual product order on RK.
(D) Xt = (Y0;:::;Yt) is a sequence of publicly observed estimates of K unobserved param-
eters, e.g. unknown productivity of the match  a la Jovanovic (1979a).
(E) Xt is a capital stock with a random growth rate, e.g. Xt+1 = Yt(Xt +
P
i eit), where
(Yt : t  0) is an exogenous stochastic process as in any of the previous examples.
By Assumption 4, no two partnerships are identical (with positive probability). Even if
two partnerships are payo-identical, the players in those partnerships will observe dierent
realizations of the public randomization. Access to a public randomization can allow strictly
greater expected welfare to be supported in partnership-market equilibria. Intuitively, if the
randomization is used to coordinate on more or less desirable equilibria of the partnership
game, players in a productive relationship will treat their current partner well for fear that
they may get a \bad draw" in future partnerships. This role of public randomization is
well-known from the literature on non-stochastic repeated games, and guarantees that the
maximal joint outside option v (to be dened in (24)) can be supported in partnership-
market equilibrium. By giving players access to a public randomization, I focus on the more
novel aspects of this paper's analysis, such as whether v can be supported by (renegotiation-
proof) joint-welfare maximizing equilibrium play.
Assumption 5 imposes at least two substantive economic restrictions. First, shocks to a
partnership are idiosyncratic to the players in that partnership. This rules out the possibility
of market-wide shocks (correlated across partnerships active at the same time), which would
of course be interesting to study in the context of enriching existing models of the business
cycle. Indeed, extending the present analysis to allow for correlated shocks appears to be
an important and promising direction for future research. Second, shocks to a partnership
have no bearing on future partnerships in which those players might participate. Thus, the
\state" here does not capture any payo-relevant characteristics of the players themselves,
such as intelligence, beauty, or skills.
294 Welfare-maximizing equilibrium
The analysis here has two parts. Section 4.1 characterizes the joint-welfare maximizing
subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE) of the partnership game for any given outside options
v = (v1;v2) (Theorem 1), and develops welfare and turnover comparative statics (Theorems
2-3). Section 4.2 then characterizes the maximal social welfare that can be supported in the
partnership market (Theorem 4), and explores some properties of the partnership-market
equilibria that support this maximal social welfare. Namely, I provide sucient conditions
for equilibrium social welfare to be maximized by joint-welfare maximizing SPE play within
each partnership.
4.1 Joint-welfare maximizing subgame-perfect equilibrium
Let 
eqm
t (xt;et 1;v) denote the maximal joint payo that can be achieved in any SPE of
the partnership game given outside options v = (vi;vj), as evaluated before eorts at time
t from payo-relevant history (xt;et 1).21 I will demonstrate an equilibrium that achieves
this maximal SPE joint payo at every history reached on the equilibrium path.
By deviating from time-t eort-prole et with zero eort and then quitting, player i can
increase his time-t stage-game payo by cit(et;xt) and then enjoy outside option vi with
probability  (should he not die that period). Thus, to support eort-prole et, each player
i's equilibrium continuation payo (including wage transfers) after time-t eorts must be
at least vi + cit(et;xt). In particular, costly eorts can only be sustained if joint equilib-
rium continuation payo inside the partnership exceeds players' (survival-weighted) joint
outside option plus their joint cost of eort. Assuming that continuation play after time-t
eorts maximize players' joint equilibrium continuation payo, equilibrium joint welfare is
21Without loss, one may restrict attention to SPE in which payos depend on the history of past states xt
only through the current state xt. Indeed, the current state may depend on the full history of past states.
For example, if xt = (xt 1;yt) for all t > 0, then the distribution of Xt can depend on all of the \new
information" (x0;y1;:::;yt 1) learned during the course of the partnership. Further, it is without loss to
restrict attention to SPE in which payos do not depend on the history of wages.
























In fact, this maximal joint payo can be realized in SPE, with eorts et(xt;et 1) played at
each history (xt;et 1) on the equilibrium path.
Theorem 1 (Joint-welfare maximizing SPE). A SPE exists that maximizes joint payo
among all SPE at every history. On the equilibrium path of play, (i) players exert eorts
et(xt;et 1) (dened in (15)) at every history (xt;et 1), (ii) both stay i doing so is ecient
given their joint equilibrium continuation payo, and (iii) wages are paid (if at all) at the
end of each period only if both players survive and stay.
Comparative statics. Theorem 1 is proven by an algorithmic argument (outlined in the
text below) in the spirit of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990). A side-benet of this
algorithmic style of proof is that I am also able to establish comparative statics properties
of the joint-welfare maximizing equilibrium, by showing that these properties are preserved
at every step of the algorithm, as well as in the limit.
Theorem 2 (Welfare increasing in the state). The maximal joint welfare 
eqm
t (xt;et 1;v)
that can be realized in SPE from history (xt;et 1) is weakly increasing in xt, for all et 1.
The model imposes essentially no restriction on how eorts can control the stochastic
process. Consequently, there is little that one can say in general about how eorts in the
welfare-maximizing SPE vary with the state, nor on how the history of eorts impacts
equilibrium variables such as players' payos, eorts, and exit. Indeed, although Theorem 2
establishes that players' joint payo in the joint-welfare maximizing SPE is increasing in the
state xt, neither joint stage-game payo nor joint continuation payo need be increasing in
xt. Consequently, partners may exert lower eorts and even be more likely to exit in higher
states. However, additional comparative statics are available in a notable special case, when
players' eorts have no impact on future states.
31Denition 8 (Exogenous stochastic process). (Xt : t  0) is an exogenous stochastic process
if the distribution of Xt depends only on (t;xt 1).
Given exogeneity, players' eort-decisions at time t have no impact on the set of SPE
continuation payos. Thus, in any joint-welfare maximizing SPE, players will choose what-
ever eorts maximize joint stage-game payo, among those satisfying the relevant incentive-
compatibility constraint.
Theorem 3 (Comparative statics with an exogenous state). Suppose that (Xt : t  0) is an
exogenous stochastic process. In the joint-welfare maximizing SPE, at every history reached
on the equilibrium path: (i) players' joint stage-game payo and joint continuation payo are
each weakly increasing in xt; and (ii) partnership stopping time conditional on xt is weakly
increasing in xt, in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance.
Proof sketch for Theorems 1-2. The rest of this section provides a sketch of the proof
of Theorems 1-2. (The proof of Theorem 3 is in the Appendix.)
Part I: Credibility and optimality of eorts et(xt;et 1) and associated \retention bonuses".
The rst part of the proof hinges on an important preliminary result.
Lemma 3 (Joint-welfare maximizing SPE play). Suppose that SPE exist such that, at time
t+1 from each history (xt+1;et), players' joint payo is 
eqm
t+1(xt+1;et;v). (i) A SPE exists
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(ii) In this SPE, wages are paid (if at all) at the end of each period only if both players
survive and stay.
Lemma 3 vastly simplies the analysis since it implies that an eort-prole can be im-
plemented in SPE i its joint cost of eort is less than the partnership's excess return over
the players' joint outside option. In other words, one may view partners as choosing their
32eort-prole optimally subject to the endogenous incentive constraint (18),22 i.e. they will
play eorts et(xt;et 1) at every history (xt;et 1).
Part II: Algorithmic characterization of the optimal SPE. Next, I develop an algorithmic
argument in the spirit of APS to characterize the joint-welfare maximizing SPE of the part-
nership game. APS characterize the set of all SPE strategies as the limit of a decreasing
sequence of sets of strategy proles. The approach developed here diers in two ways. First,
I focus on the simpler issue of characterizing just the maximal joint payo that can be sup-
ported in SPE. Conceptually, at each stage of the APS algorithm,23 identify the maximal
joint payo that can be achieved by any remaining strategy proles. Clearly, the sequence
of such upper bounds on joint payo is decreasing and converges to the maximal SPE joint
payo. Second, and more important, the additional structure here allows me to establish
new results about the joint-welfare maximizing SPE. Conceptually, by keeping track of the
strategies that achieve the upper bound on joint payos at every step of the APS algorithm,
and by showing that these strategies always satisfy certain properties, I can prove by induc-
tion that the joint-welfare maximizing SPE strategies also possess those properties. This
allows me to prove, for example, that maximal SPE joint payo is weakly increasing in the
state (Theorem 2) as well as, later, additional welfare and turnover comparative statics when
the state follows an exogenous stochastic process (Theorem 3).
Lemma 3 maps the maximal joint payo that can be supported at time t + 1 to the
maximal joint payo that can be supported at time t. Thus, one can construct a sequence




t(xt;et 1;v) : k = 1;2;:::
o
, such that 
k
t(xt;et 1;v)
is non-increasing in k and converges to the maximal SPE joint payo at history (xt;et 1).
22The incentive condition (18) arises naturally in repeated games with voluntary transfers. More novel
here is the observation regarding the optimal timing of wages. In repeated games with exit and iid payos,
wages paid at any time can provide equivalent incentives to work and stay in the relationship (see Levin
(2003) for a discussion). By contrast, in this paper's stochastic environment, the timing of wages matters.
Whereas Lemma 3 establishes that it is without loss to assume that wages are paid at the very end of each
period, McAdams (2010) provides an example showing that paying wages just after eorts are observed (in
the form of \performance bonuses") does entail loss of generality.
23The approach developed in APS can be extended in a natural way to dynamic repeated games. See e.g.
Chapter 5.7.1 of Mailath and Samuelson (2006).
33Also importantly for this paper's purposes, these upper bounds exhibit a monotonicity in
the state, i.e. 
k


























Figure 6: Key steps of the algorithmic argument.
Key steps of the algorithmic argument (illustrated in Figure 6): Suppose that there exist
upper bounds 
k
t(xt;et 1;v) on SPE joint payo from all histories at all times and that
these upper bounds are weakly increasing in the current state xt. The essence of the proof
is to use these upper bounds to derive weakly lower upper bounds 
k+1
t (xt;et 1;v) at all
histories that remain weakly increasing in xt. Here in the text, I provide the inductive step
to construct this sequence of upper bounds on joint payo and show that monotonicity in
xt is preserved along this sequence. In the Appendix, I prove that this sequence of bounds
is weakly decreasing in k and that it converges to joint payo that can be realized in SPE.
Step A. Given bounds 
k
t+1(xt+1;et;v) on joint continuation payo at time t + 1, joint
continuation payo after time-t eorts is bounded by

k




























t+1(xt+1;et;v) is weakly increasing in xt+1. Thus, the set fxt+1 :

k
t+1(Xt+1;et;v)  zg is an increasing subset of Xt+1 for all z. By Assumption 3, then,
each of the probability terms inside the integral in (20) is weakly increasing in xt. Thus,

k
t(xt;et;v) is weakly increasing in xt.
Step B. Let F
k+1
t (xt;et 1;v) be the set of time-t eorts that can be supported in SPE given
joint continuation payos 
k
t(xt;et;v) after eort, i.e. those satisfying the IC-constraint
34(18) given these expected joint continuation payos after time-t eort. Since (18) slackens
with higher continuation payos, the fact that 
k
t(xt;et;v) is weakly increasing in xt implies
that F
k+1
t (xt;et 1;v) is weakly increasing in xt, relative to the set inclusion order.
Step C. By Lemma 3, we may dene new upper bounds on time-t SPE joint payo,

k+1
















weakly increasing in xt, while t(et;xt) is weakly increasing in xt by Assumption 2.
The remainder of the proof is in the Appendix.
4.2 Social-welfare maximizing partnership-market equilibrium
A social-welfare maximizing partnership-market equilibrium is one that maximizes players'
joint outside option, among all partnership-market equilibria. Recall that 
eqm
t (xt;et 1;v)
denotes the maximal SPE joint payo at history (xt;et 1) given outside options v = (vi;vj).
Lemma 4 establishes that this maximal joint payo depends on players' outside options only
through their sum.
Lemma 4. v0
 = v implies 
eqm
t (xt;et 1;v0) = 
eqm
t (xt;et 1;v).
Proof. The proof of Lemma 4 is immediate from the algorithmic construction in the proof of
Theorems 1-2. Lemma 4 can also be viewed as a corollary of Lemma 3, once one observes that
players' outside options do not appear in the objective (17) or in the constraint (18) except
through the sum v. Intuitively, asymmetries in players' outside options have no impact on
what can be achieved in equilibrium, since any such asymmetries can be counter-balanced
by appropriate retention bonuses.
Denition 9 (Maximal SPE joint payo). Let 
eqm
t (xt;et 1;v) denote the maximal joint
payo in any SPE from history (xt;et 1), as a function of players' joint outside option v.







4 establishes that this maximal joint outside option can in fact be supported in equilibrium,
and shows one way in which to do so.
35Theorem 4 (Maximal social welfare). In social-welfare maximizing partnership-market equi-
libria, players' endogenous joint outside option is
v = sup














0 (X0;v)] v, then both players exert zero eort and quit immediately; otherwise, con-
tinuation play maximizes SPE joint welfare as in Theorem 1.
Discussion of Theorem 4: Suppose for the moment that the maximal expected joint payo






, is continuous in the players' joint outside








and Theorem 4 implies that equilibrium social welfare is maximized only when players max-
imize equilibrium joint welfare within each partnership.
This nding sheds new light on a well-known result in the literature on repeated games
with re-matching. In non-stochastic repeated games with re-matching, maximizing social
welfare always requires that partners fail to maximize joint welfare. (See Section 5.2 of
Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for a particularly clear exposition.) A key insight that
emerges here is that the tension between market-wide and individual partnership perfor-
mance disappears once partnerships are not created equal, namely, when \rst impressions"
are payo-relevant. Indeed, even quite modest initial stochastic variation across partnerships
eliminates the need to perform sub-optimally at the start of relationships, as when the initial
state is augmented with a \partnership type" S0  U[0;1] as follows.
Assumption 6 (Meaningful rst impressions). Xt = (Yt;S0) for all t, where S0  U[0;1]
and, for all t;yt, (yt;s0
0)  (yt;s0) for all s0
0 > s0 and it(e0
t;s0;yt)   it(et;s0;yt) is strictly
increasing in s0 for all i and e0
t  et.
S0 is a public signal (that I refer to as \the rst impression" or as \the partnership type")
observed by players at the start of their relationship, capturing an aspect of match quality
that, by denition, increases players' stage-game payos and decreases their cost of eort.
36Note that Theorem 5 holds no matter how small the impact of the partnership type on
payos.
Theorem 5. Given meaningful rst impressions, a full measure of partnerships achieve the
maximal SPE joint payo in any social-welfare maximizing partnership-market equilibrium.
Discussion of Theorem 5. The presence of meaningful rst impressions eliminates the need
to \waste surplus" at the start of relationships. Intuitively, the reason is that observing
a payo-relevant type at time t = 0 breaks players' indierence over potential partners.
When players do not care about the identity of their partner, each player will naturally
be concerned that his current partner will cheat him and then re-match with an equally
attractive replacement. Burning money at the start of every partnership allows players to
assuage this concern. Once players strictly prefer some partners over others, however, the
re-matching market no longer provides \easy pickings" for a cheater. In particular, players
will reject any partner who is not a suciently good t, and fear of future rejection provides
a deterrent against misbehavior in any suciently well-matched partnership. Of course, the
threshold for a \suciently good t" is endogenous. It is determined so that players at this
threshold are indierent between (i) staying and playing the joint-welfare maximizing SPE
of Theorem 1 or (ii) quitting to re-match. (For a worked-out example, see Section 2.2.)
When rst impressions matter, Theorem 5 implies that all social-welfare maximizing
partnership-market equilibria specify joint-welfare maximizing play.24 Theorem 6 establishes
that joint-welfare maximizing play is also sucient to maximize equilibrium social welfare
in this case.








Discussion of Theorem 6: Outside options v = (vi;vj) are generated by joint-welfare max-






for i = 1;2. Theorem 6 implies that only one
joint outside option can be generated by joint-welfare maximizing SPE play. (This result is
24If (15) has multiple solutions at some history, then there will exist dierent social-welfare maximizing
SPE in which each of these optimal IC eorts is played. Otherwise, eorts are unique.
37not obvious, since equilibrium play depends on the outside option.) Technically, the proof
proceeds by showing that the maximal excess joint return of a new partnership over the






  v, is strictly decreasing in v. Intuitively,
as players' outside options become less valuable, they have more reason to work and invest in
their relationship. Thus, even if falling outside options are bad news in the sense of lowering
equilibrium payos, this loss is mitigated by the fact that the players' partnership becomes
stronger and more productive.
Social-welfare maximizing partnership-market equilibria could potentially dier in how
the surplus is divided between the players. For example, if a wife anticipates that her next
husband will pay her a handsome wage, then her current husband might need to pay her
a wage to induce her to stay. In this way, even if there exists a social-welfare maximizing
partnership-market equilibrium in which no wages are paid, other such equilibria might exist
in which either player receives the lion's share of the surplus.
Steady-state distribution over partnership histories. One may view a partnership
as a Markov chain over histories ht = (xt;et 1), where any partnership that ends at time t
is understood to transition to a brand new partnership (with new partners).
Suppose that a partnership is currently in history ht. Let et(ht) be the eort-prole played
in the optimal SPE at this history, as characterized in the proof of Theorem 2. Similarly, let
pexit
t (ht) be the probability that at least one player would quit at time t after this history,
and let Xt+1(ht)  Xt+1j(ht;et(ht)) denote next-period's state should the partnership persist
to that time. Transition probabilities among histories may be fully described as follows:
 With probability 1   2, the partnership will end due to death, after which a new
partnership will be created having random initial history H0 = X0.
 With probability 2pexit
t (xt;et 1), the partnership will end due to some partner's en-
dogenous departure, after which a new partnership will again be created.
 With probability (1 2)(1 pexit
t (xt;et 1)), the partnership will continue to time t+1,
with an augmented random history Ht+1 = (ht;et(ht);Xt+1(ht)).
38Note that, through the process of death and re-birth, all histories that are reached on the
equilibrium path communicate and are positively recurrent. Thus, this Markov chain is
ergodic and there exists a unique steady-state distribution over histories.
Claim 2 (Steady-state distribution). For every partnership-market equilibrium, there exists
a unique steady-state distribution over partnership histories.
Proof. This result follows from standard Markov-chain methods; details are omitted to save
space. See Sections 4.3 and 4.6.2 of Ross (1996), especially Theorem 4.3.3.
In the remainder of this section, I discuss some qualitative features of a \typical" player's
life experience, assuming welfare-maximizing partnership-market equilibrium play.
Dating. At time t = 0, players will immediately exit any relationship in which the realized
initial state is in a decreasing subset of X0. Consequently, any player who is seeking a new
partner will typically experience several partnerships that each last exactly one period { and
in which both players exert zero eort because they anticipate no future interaction { before
nding a partner who they do not immediately leave.
Honeymoon. In any partnership that continues to a second period, players obviously ex-
pect higher continuation payos than during their unsuccessful dating phase. In fact, such
\newly-joined" partners will also enjoy higher stage-game payos than when they were un-
successfully dating, for two reasons. First, the initial state in a \successful date" will be
higher than in an unsuccessful one, allowing players to generate higher stage-game payos
from any time-0 eorts (Assumption 2). Second, since the players view their future rela-
tionship as generating higher continuation payos than their outside options, they can also
support non-trivial eort at time t = 0.
Of course, there is no guarantee that a surviving partnership in its earliest periods will
be very protable or very stable. For instance, it could be that the initial state lies very
close to the threshold below which the partnership would not have formed, and that there is
a high likelihood of break-up in the near future. However, since this caveat applies equally
to non-strategic models that identify a \honeymoon eect", such as Fichman and Levinthal
39(1991),25 one can say that social-welfare equilibrium play here also exhibits a \honeymoon
eect" { if players form meaningful rst impressions, so that social-welfare maximizing
play dictates joint-welfare maximizing play from the start of each relationship. Otherwise,
social-welfare maximizing play dictates that players in new partnerships receive articially
depressed payos, a sort of \anti-honeymoon eect".26
Hard times. The state of a partnership may rise and fall many times, in ways that aect
the extent of cooperation that can be supported in the welfare-maximizing equilibrium. This
volatility of players' willingness to cooperate creates payo volatility that in turn creates an
endogenous option value to remaining in the relationship. Consequently, players tend to
remain in relationships even when stage-game payos are low, in hopes that their partner's
behavior will improve.
Good times and golden years. Players stay in the partnership during hard times in the
hope that they will enjoy positive shocks that will enable them to enjoy higher prots and
greater stability in the future. Indeed, depending on the details of the stochastic process
(Xt : t  0), there may be an increasing subset of the state-space from which the partnership
is certain never to end, save by exogenous death. Such \golden years" can arise for two sorts
of reasons. First, there may be an absorbing portion of the state-space, that is everywhere
high enough to support continuation of the partnership. Second, equilibrium eorts in high
enough states may be suciently high and feedback from protable eorts may be positive
enough to overwhelm any exogenous shocks that might cause the relationship to deteriorate.
4.3 Extension: positive matching cost
The analysis of Sections 4.1-4.2 can be readily adapted to an extension of the model in
which players must pay m > 0 whenever (re-)matched. The main dierence is that players'
25Fichman and Levinthal (1991) consider an organization's decision to form and disband, when prots
follow an exogenous random walk. The analysis here diers in several ways, the most important being that
(i) prots are endogenous and (ii) the outside option is endogenous.
26The term \anti-honeymoon" is not standard, but this idea is well-known. See e.g. Section 5.2 of Mailath
and Samuelson (2006).
40outside options depend on whether there is an active re-matching market. If players of either
gender do not expect to recoup the matching cost in a new partnership, no new partnerships
will form and each player's outside option is zero. In particular, for large enough matching
costs, all partnership-market equilibria are trivial ones in which (i) partnerships never form
and (ii) should they form, play proceeds as in a SPE of the partnership game given zero
outside options. For small enough matching costs, however, the social-welfare maximizing
partnership-market equilibrium is non-trivial, with non-negative outside options generated
by the prospect of starting a new partnership:
vi = E [
eqm
i0 (X0;v)]   m  0 for i = 1;2; (25)
where 
eqm
i0 (x0;v) denotes player i's payo in some SPE of the partnership game given initial
state x0 and outside options v = (vi;vj). (The set of such SPE payos is characterized in
Section 4.1.)
Claim 3. Given meaningful rst impressions, v(m) is strictly decreasing in m in a neigh-
borhood of m = 0.
Discussion: An increase in matching costs has competing eects on payos in the social-
welfare maximizing equilibrium. While players must pay more to form each partnership, such
costs can act as an exit deterrent and hence encourage players to work and invest in their
current partnership. However, this benet of better partnership performance only arises if
the overall eect of higher matching costs is to lower players' outside options. Thus, this
overall eect must be weakly negative on ex ante payos. Indeed, the overall eect of higher
matching cost is strictly negative since players will respond to higher partnership formation
costs by sampling strictly fewer partners, leading to a strictly worse average t among active
partnerships when rst impressions are payo-relevant.
By contrast, in non-stochastic repeated games with re-matching, maximizing social wel-
fare requires that players \waste" some expected surplus at the start of their partnership,
in order to incentivize eort in established relationships. Matching costs then serve as a
substitute for such waste, allowing players to support the same social welfare for all small
enough matching costs.
415 Concluding Remarks
In their study of relational contracts in developing economies, Johnson, McMillan, and
Woodru (2002) emphasize the importance of established relationships in supporting the
\trust" necessary to work together in an environment lacking a reliable court system. The
theory of repeated games with re-matching has advanced two alternative explanations for
why players may only trust those with whom they already have a working relationship. Ac-
cording to one view (see e.g. Kranton (1996)), social custom may require that players incur
costs / forego potential equilibrium benets (\burn money") when establishing a relation-
ship. Since players already in a relationship prefer to avoid burning money a second time,
they will be careful to treat their current partner well. According to a second view (see e.g.
Sobel (1985)), players' actions may signal information about their motives to their current
partner, so that surviving partnerships are only those in which both players have proven
themselves suciently trustworthy.
One of the novel ndings of this paper is that burning money is never socially optimal
when (i) players have no private information and (ii) players form \meaningful rst impres-
sions" that are at least somewhat informative of future payos. Put dierently, increasing
the cost of forming a new relationship unambiguously lowers social welfare under these con-
ditions. Thus, this paper sheds light on the set of circumstances in which we should expect
costly courtship. In addition to settings with private information, in which a suitor may feel
compelled to prove his love, courtship may arise in environments in which players can only
learn about the quality of their match after forming a new relationship.
Separately, a broad empirical literature from Topel and Ward (1992) on employment,
Levinthal (1991) on rm survival, and Stevenson and Wolfers (2007) on marriage have
established certain stylized facts about relationship dynamics. For instance, partnerships
often exhibit a \honeymoon eect" and a \survivorship bias" in that very young and very
old partnerships are often more protable and less likely to end in the near future than
those of intermediate age. A rich theoretical literature has provided a foundation for such
dynamics in a context with one-sided incentives. For instance, in a labor search context (e.g.
Pissarides (1994)), workers will only start a new job and/or leave their current job when
42presented with a suciently attractive new opportunity, so that new jobs will tend at rst
to be highly productive honeymoons. Similarly, when each rm's productivity is subject to
persistent random shocks (e.g. Jovanovic (1982)), longer-lived rms will tend to be those
that have received mostly positive shocks and hence be more likely to survive in the near
future.
This paper extends this existing literature by adding two-sided incentives and a rich
stochastic structure. The resulting theory generates potentially testable predictions about
the dynamics and duration of partnerships (and of search interludes between matches) in
novel applications ranging from supply-chain and customer relationships to joint ventures, as
well as potentially enriching the study of classic applications in labor and macroeconomics.
I conclude with a brief discussion of a few directions that I hope to pursue in future work.
Macroeconomic shocks. One interesting direction for future research would be to consider
the interaction between macroeconomic shocks and partnership performance and turnover
dynamics. For instance, suppose that all active partnerships are subject to common mul-
tiplicative shocks to productivity,27 but that matching costs do not change over time. In
this context, positive shocks naturally induce greater search, as players care relatively more
about nding a better match. Such intensied search will lead to (i) less stable and hence
less productive partnerships but also (ii) higher-quality matches, with implications for how
macroeconomic shocks aect equilibrium social welfare.
Transitional dynamics. Similarly, it would be interesting to adapt this paper's analysis to
characterize transitional dynamics, when the partnership market is not in steady state after
a macroeconomic shock. This could shed new light, for instance, on how the activity of labor
markets varies over a recessionary cycle.
Changing individuals. In this paper, each player's next partnership is stochastically identical
to his current one. In other words, all shocks are to partnerships, not to the individuals
in those partnerships. Of course, individuals may also change in ways that will persist in
a new match. Enriching the model to allow for such personal characteristics is important
27That is, stage-game payos take the form tit(et;xt) where xt is a partnership-specic state and t is
a common factor in all active partnerships.
43and could have profound implications for the steady-state distribution of the partnership
market. For one thing, the set of players seeking to re-match will be adversely selected. This
could increase active partners' desire to avoid the re-matching market, creating a still deeper
adverse selection in this market.
Endogenous learning. The model here can capture a wide variety of \learning" settings in the
spirit of Jovanovic (1979a), including ones in which players make investments to increase the
precision of a public signal about an unobserved payo-relevant parameter. (Such investment
could be one aspect of players' multi-dimensional eort.) When investing in a more precise
signal of the underlying state, players create short-term volatility in their beliefs about the
state. Such volatility can increase the value of the players' option to exit, but could also be
harmful if it disrupts an otherwise productive partnership. This suggests a speculation, that
players in a stable relationship may actively seek to avoid uncovering new information, while
players in a rocky relationship may seek to uncover as much new information as possible.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. Because (Ct : t  0) is a Markov process, the optimal exit rule is memoryless:
there exists an \optimal exit-set" E  R++ such that the players terminate the partnership
in the rst period t in which ct 2 E. A necessary condition of optimality is that, given
work threshold cW and exit-set E, expected joint payo is maximized by terminating the
partnership when the current state is in E and by otherwise not terminating the partnership.
Indeed, given that (log(Ct) : t  0) is a random walk and joint stage-game payo each
period is non-increasing in the state ct, this necessary condition pins down the optimal exit-
set as of the form E = [cE(cW;v);1), for some exit threshold cE(cW;v). (The details are
straightforward and omitted to save space. See e.g. Dixit and Pindyck (1994).) To complete
the proof, I need to show that cE(cW;v) = (v)cW, where (v) is non-increasing in v.
Suppose for the moment that cE(cW;v) > 0. A necessary condition of optimality is
that, conditional on c0 = cE(cW;v), players' joint payo is the same whether they both stay
44or quit, given that continuation play will be according to thresholds (cW;cE(cW;v)). (If
cE(cW;v) = 0, joint payo must be weakly higher when players quit, and the argument is
easily modied.) In particular,
E[#ft 2 f1;2;:::;T(c
E(c















where T(cE) denotes the stopping time of the partnership when both players adopt exit
threshold cE, and T die
i is the time of player i's death. (26) is an indierence condition. LHS
of (26) captures the benet of staying in the partnership, that each player will enjoy some
future periods in which both will work (when ct  cW) with stage-game payo of one. RHS
of (26) captures the benet of quitting, that each player will avoid the possibility of losing
their outside option v to death. (If T die
i > T(cE(cW;v)), then player i survives as either a
\widow" or \divorcee".)
By denition, T(cE) is the rst time at which ct > cE and/or some player dies. Con-
ditional on c0 = cE, then, T(cE) is the rst time at which Ct
C0 > 1 and/or some player
dies. Since log(Ct) is a random walk, the distribution of Ct
C0 is independent of C0. Thus,
the distribution of T sep = minft : Ct
C0 > 1gj(c0 = cE) does not depend on cE. (T sep is
mnemonic for \time of separation".) Since T(cE) = minfT sep;T die
i ;T die
j jg and death is in-




i = T(cE)jc0 = cE
does not depend on cE. In particular, the RHS of (26) does
not depend on cE(cW;v), and the LHS of (26) depends on cE(cW;v) only through the ratio
cE(cW;v)
cW  (v) (again, because (log(Ct) : t  0) is a random walk). We conclude that, for all
work thresholds cW > 0, the optimal exit threshold cE(cW;v) = (v)cW for some (v)  0.
The key observation to prove that cE(cW;v) is non-increasing in v is that the LHS of (26)
is non-increasing in the exit threshold, i.e. E[#ft 2 f1;2;:::;T(cE)g : Ct  cWgjc0 = cE] is
non-increasing in cE. To see why, note that (log(Ct) : t  0) being a random walk implies
(i) the distribution of T(cE)j(c0 = cE) does not depend on cE and (ii) Pr(Ct  cWjc0) is
non-increasing in c0. On the other hand, as discussed above, Pr
 
T die
i = T(cE)jc0 = cE
does
not depend on cE. By (26), then, cE(cW;v) is non-increasing in v.
45Proof of Lemma 2.
Proof. As shorthand, let \v-SPE" refer to a SPE of the partnership game when the players'
outside option equals v.
Part I: cW(vh)  cW(vl). Suppose there exists a vh-SPE in which players adopt work
threshold cW(vh). I will show that there exists a vl-SPE in which players adopt the same
work threshold cW(vh) and the vl-optimal exit threshold (vl)cW(vh) (see Lemma 1). This
will imply that cW(vl)  cW(vh).
As an intermediate step, suppose that players were to adopt the vh-SPE strategies given
outside option vl. That is, the players both adopt work threshold cW(vh) and quit at exactly
the same histories as in the vh-SPE. Given outside option vh, at every on-path history at
which ct  cW(vh), each player gets continuation payo after time-t eorts of at least ct+vh.
(Otherwise, each player would prefer to shirk and then quit should he survive to the end
of period t.) Given outside option vl, each player's stream of payos diers only in that he
gets vh  vl less when enjoying his outside option. Since he survives after time-t eorts only
with probability , each player's continuation payo is at most (vh   vl) lower than given
outside option vh. At every on-path history at which ct  cW(vh), then, each player gets
continuation payo after time-t eorts of at least ct + vl. Thus, each player is willing to
adopt work threshold cW(vh) given outside option vl if players were to follow the quitting
strategies of the vh-SPE.
Now, suppose that both players adopt work threshold cW(vh) as in the vh-SPE but
now adopt vl-optimal exit threshold (vl)cW(vh). Since this exit threshold maximizes each
player's payo from every history, each player's continuation payo from every history is no
less than when vh-SPE quitting strategies were followed. Thus, both players remain willing
to adopt work threshold cW(vh). Further, by the proof of Lemma 1, both players are willing
to adopt exit threshold (vl)cW(vh) when they both adopt work threshold cW(vh). Namely,
(cW(vh);(vl)cW(vh))-threshold equilibrium exists given outside option vl.
Part II: cW(vl)   cW(vh)  vh   vl. Let ^ cW = cW(vl)   (vh   vl) and recall that (v)cW
is the optimal exit threshold given a work threshold cW and outside option v. To show that
cW(vh)  ^ cW, it suces to show that there exists (^ cW;^ cE(vh))-threshold equilibrium given
46outside option vh, where I will use notation ^ cE(~ v) = (~ v)^ cW. To establish such equilibrium
existence, in turn, it suces to check that players are willing to work should c0 = ^ cW,
conditional on continuation play according to the work and exit thresholds (^ cW;^ cE(vh). (For
details of this step, see the proof of Proposition 1.) Since ^ cE(vh) is the optimal exit threshold
given work threshold ^ cW and outside option vh, each player's continuation payo inside the
partnership is weakly greater than under the sub-optimal exit threshold ^ cE(vl). Thus, it
suces to check that players are willing to work should c0 = ^ cW, conditional on continuation
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(27)




cW(vl) = (vl) implies that the LHS
of (27) equals E[#ft 2 f1;2;:::;T(cE(vl))g : Ct  cW(vl)gjc0 = cW(vl)]. Next, the RHS
of (27) is at most cW(vl) + vl Pr(T die
i = T(cE(vl))jc0 = cW(vl)) since (i) ^ cW = cW(vl)  
(vh   vl) and (ii) Pr(T die
i = T(cE(vl))jc0 = cW(vl)) = Pr
 
T die
i = T(^ cE(vl))jc0 = ^ cW
 1.
The desired inequality (27) then follows from the fact that (5) holds with equality when
cW = cW(vl), cE = cE(vl), and v = vl.
Proof of Lemma 3.
Proof. Let 
eqm






be shorthand for player i's ex-
pected time-t continuation payo, after eorts et from history (xt;et 1), should both players
subsequently choose to stay to period t+1 upon surviving period t. Figure 7 illustrates the
key idea of Lemma 3. As long as 
eqm
t (xt;et;v) exceeds the players' joint payo after exit,
v, plus their joint incentive to shirk from eorts et, ct(et;xt), there exists a retention
bonus promise given which both players have sucient incentive to exert eorts et and then
stay. Further, this promise is credible since each player promises less than his willingness to
pay to avoid cooperation breakdown.
28The argument here does not presume existence of (^ cW;^ cE(vl))-threshold equilibrium given outside option
vh. (Indeed, such strategies do not constitute an equilibrium, since players have an incentive to quit sooner
given a higher outside option.)







Figure 7: Eorts et are incentive-compatible when player i pays wage wit (and wjt = 0).
Let it(et) = 
eqm
it (xt;et;v)   vi   cit(et;xt) denote player i's \excess continuation
payo", the extra prot that he enjoys inside the partnership after eorts et, relative to
deviating with zero eort and then quitting the relationship. it(et) is the most that player
i can credibly promise to pay player j as a reward for not deviating from the prescribed
eorts et and then not quitting.29
Without loss, suppose that it(et)  jt(et). If it(et) + jt(et) < 0, then at least
one player who exerts positive eort must strictly prefer to deviate by exerting zero ef-
fort and then quitting, given any credible wage. Otherwise, any retention bonus wit 2
[maxf0; jt(et)g;it(et)] from player i to player j can credibly support eorts et. Thus,
eort-prole et can be supported in some SPE i it(et) + jt(et)  0, i.e. i et satises
(18). This completes the proof, since then the maximal SPE joint welfare given the specied
continuation payos is the solution to (17).
Proof of Theorems 1-2.
Proof. Let 
eqm
t (xt;et 1;v) 2 R2 be the players' payo prole in a SPE that maximizes joint
welfare among all SPE from history (xt;et 1), and let 
eqm
t (xt;et 1;v) = i
eqm
it (xt;et 1;v).
Outline of proof. I will construct a monotonically decreasing sequence of bounds on SPE
joint welfare from each history, (
k
t(xt;et 1;v) : k  0), that converges pointwise to
29Should eorts et be played, player i becomes willing to pay up to it(et)+cit(et;xt) to avoid exit. Then,
should both players survive and stay to period t + 1, player i becomes willing to pay more still to avoid
a transition to an optimal punishment continuation SPE in which both players exert zero eort, pay zero
wages, and exit for certain at time t+1. Thus, player i has sucient incentive to exert his prescribed eort,
then stay, then pay the specied bonus.
48
eqm
t (xt;et 1;v), and show that this maximal joint payo is implemented by SPE strate-
gies as specied in Theorem 1. Further, 
k
t(xt;et 1;v) is non-decreasing in xt for each k,
as well as in the limit 
eqm
t (xt;et 1;v), establishing Theorem 2.
Part I: Decreasing sequence of bounding payo-prole sets. By Assumption 1, there exists a
uniform upper bound M on players' joint payo at any history. Dene 
0
t(xt;et 1;v) = M




t . Next, for all k  1, dene 
k
t(xt;et 1;v) recursively




























t+1(xt+1;et;v) are upper bounds on joint payo at time t+1, then (29) is a
necessary condition for eorts et to be supported in any SPE from history (xt+1;et). Proof:






should they choose eort-prole et and then both stay should both survive. If players' joint
outside option v exceeds this bound, then at least one player strictly prefers to quit and
neither player can be incentivized to exert any costly eort. Otherwise, players' joint cost
of eort ct(et;xt) must be less than or equal to the amount by which their joint inside
continuation payo exceeds their joint outside option. (If not, at least one player would
strictly prefer to deviate by exerting zero eort and then quitting.) Indeed, by Lemma













t(xt;et 1;v) is non-increasing in k. (The value of the maximization (28) is







t (xt;et 1;v)  
k





t (xt;et 1;v) for all k. (Higher-than-equilibrium payos can be supported given higher-
than-equilibrium continuation payos. Thus, the fact that 
k 1








Part II: These upper bounds on joint welfare are non-decreasing in xt.
49Base step: k = 0. 
0
t(xt;et 1;v) = M is constant and hence trivially non-decreasing in xt.
Induction step: k  1. Suppose that 
k 1
t (xt;et 1;v) is non-decreasing in xt for all t. Ob-




























By the induction hypothesis, fxt+1 2 Xt+1 : 
k 1
t+1(Xt+1;et;v) > zg is an increasing subset of









is non-decreasing in xt, so that higher xt
slackens the IC-constraint (29) while increasing the second term of (28). Finally, the rst
term of (28) is non-decreasing in xt by Assumption 2. All together, we conclude that the
value of the maximization (28) is non-decreasing in xt. This completes the desired induction.
Let 
1
t(xt;et 1;v) denote the pointwise limit of 
k
t(xt;et 1;v) as k ! 1. Since

k
t(xt;et 1;v) is non-decreasing in xt for all k, 
1
t(xt;et 1;v) inherits this monotonicity
as well.
Part III: Limit of upper bounds can be achieved in SPE. It suces now to show that

1
t (xt;et 1;v) = 
eqm
t (xt;et 1;v). As shown earlier, 
1
t (xt;et 1;v)  
eqm
t (xt;et 1;v). Let
et(xt;et 1) denote a limit of any sequence of solutions to (28) subject to (29), as k ! 1. By
construction, eorts et(xt;et 1) are incentive-compatible if players expect continuation play
in later periods that generates time-(t+1) payos of 
1
t+1(xt+1;et;v) for each player. Again by
construction, these eorts generate continuation payos 
1
t+1(xt+1;et;v); thus, these strate-
gies constitute a joint-welfare maximizing SPE. Thus, 
1
t (xt;et 1;v)  
eqm
t (xt;et 1;v).
This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3
By Theorem 2, joint payo 
eqm
t (xt;et 1;v) in the joint-welfare maximizing SPE is weakly
increasing in xt for all (et 1;v) . Given an exogenous stochastic process, further, such payos
50do not depend on the history of eorts. Since outside options v = (vi;vj) are held xed, I
will henceforth use the simpler notation 
eqm
t (xt) here.
Proof of (i). Recall that 
eqm
t (xt) = maxet
 




































is weakly increasing in xt: fxt+1 : 
eqm
t+1(Xt+1) > zg is an increasing subset of Xt+1 so that,
by Assumption 3, each of the probability terms in (31) is weakly increasing in xt. Finally,
since eorts do not control future payos, time-t eorts in the optimal SPE will be chosen
to maximize joint stage-game payo subject to the IC-constraint. Since joint continuation
payo is weakly increasing in xt, so is the set of eort-proles et satisfying the IC-constraint.
Consequently, realized joint stage-game payo is weakly increasing in xt.
Proof of (ii). Let QUITt = fxt 2 Xt : 
eqm
t (xt) < vg and STAYt = Xtn QUITt denote
the set of time-t states in which both players quit and stay, respectively, in the joint-welfare
maximizing SPE of Theorem 1. Since joint continuation payo is weakly increasing in xt by
Theorem 3(i), STAYt is an increasing set for all t.
Let pk
t(xt) denote the probability that the partnership will survive until at least time
t+k, conditional on Xt = xt. I need to show that, for each k  1, pk
t(xt) is weakly increasing
in xt. The proof is by induction.
Base step. At any time t, the partnership is certain to end if xt 2 QUITt and otherwise ends
with probability 1   2 if xt 2 STAYt. Thus, p1
t(xt) being weakly decreasing in xt follows
directly from STAYt being an increasing subset of Xt.30
Induction step. As the induction hypothesis, suppose that pm
t (xt) is weakly increasing in xt
for all t and all m = 1;:::;k   1. I need to show that pk













30DETAILS FOR REFEREES: (i) p1
t(xt) 2 f1   2;1g for all xt, (ii) p1
t(xt) = 1 implies p1
t(x0
t) = 1 for all
x0
t  xt, and (iii) p1
t(xt) = 1   2 implies p1
t(x0
t) = 1   2 for all x0
t  xt.
51(The partnership survives for k periods i it survives for k   1 periods after rst surviving
for one period.) The base step showed that p1
t(xt) is weakly increasing in xt. It suces now
















 Xt = xt

dp (33)
By the induction hypothesis, each set fxt+1 2 Xt+1 : p
k 1
t+1(xt+1) > pg is an increasing subset
of Xt+1. By Assumption 3, we conclude that each of the probability-terms in (33) is weakly
increasing in xt. This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 4
As argued in the text, no joint outside option greater than v can possibly be supported
in partnership-market equilibrium. To complete the proof, it suces to verify that the
strategies specied in Theorem 4 constitute a SPE and generate outside options v. (The
theorem species play on the equilibrium path; augment this with shirking and quitting to
start a fresh relationship should either player deviate from this path of play.)






0 (X0;v)] v be the probability with which players shirk and quit immedi-
ately based on the public randomization. Note that, by construction,







Thus, if players adopt the specied strategies, market-wide play generates ex ante expected
joint payo v at birth, supporting the maximal joint outside option v. It suces now to
show that these strategies constitute a SPE. First, players are willing to shirk and quit when
the public randomization is less than ^ p, since they expect uncooperative continuation play
in the current relationship. Second, given joint outside option v, Theorem 1 species SPE
continuation play should the public randomization be more favorable. This completes the
proof.
Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. To complete the proof, it suces to show that E[
eqm
0 (S0;Y0;v)] is continuous in
v. (Recall that Xt = (S0;Yt) where S0  U[0;1] is the partners' \rst impression"; see
52Assumption 6.) If so, the maximization (24) requires that v = E[
eqm
0 (S0;Y0;v)], which
in turn is only possible if a probability-one measure of partnerships achieve the maximal
joint equilibrium payo 
eqm
0 (S0;Y0;v) given their endogenous outside options.
An increase in joint outside option from v to v+" has two eects on the maximal SPE
joint payo. First, the direct eect is that players enjoy higher joint payo when quitting
and quit whenever they were previously almost indierent to doing so. This direct eect







is non-increasing in v (see Part I of the proof of Theorem 6, which does not depend on
Theorem 5), an indirect eect is that players can support (weakly) fewer eort-proles at
every history ht = (s0;yt;et 1). This decreases payos at those histories, inducing more exit
and less eort at previous histories, and so on in a backward cascade that decreases joint
payo. This indirect eect of higher v may have a discontinuous eect on ex post payos
but I will show that, when there are meaningful rst impressions, it has a continuous eect
on ex ante expected payos.
Recall that players' eorts et(ht;v) maximize joint payo subject to the IC-constraint









I begin by showing that (35) binds with zero probability on the equilibrium path. Fix any
joint outside option v, eort-prole et, history of eort proles et 1, and state xt = (s0;yt).
By Assumption 6, cit(et;s0;yt) is strictly decreasing in s0 for each player i while, by the proof






is weakly increasing in s0. Thus, if the IC-
constraint (35) binds for some eorts et at history (s0;yt;et 1), then for all sl
0 < s0 < sh
0 it fails
at history (sl
0;yt;et 1) and is strictly satised at history (sh
0;yt;et 1). Since by assumption
there are nitely many eort-levels, (35) binds on et(s0;yt;et 1) for nitely many partnership
types s0 2 R. We conclude that, with probability one in the joint-welfare maximizing SPE,
31To simplify the presentation, I focus on the case in which there is a unique such maximizer at almost all
histories reached on the equilibrium path. More generally, the proof extends almost unchanged, when one






in v requires that the IC-constraint be binding on
all such maximizers at a set of histories reached with positive probability.
53the IC-constraint will not be binding on any eort-prole prescribed on the equilibrium path.
Next, I prove right-continuity, that lim"!0 
eqm
t (ht;v + ") = 
eqm
t (ht;v) for all v and
all histories ht reached with probability one on the equilibrium path. For this step, I employ
a variation on the algorithm used in the proof of Theorem 2 (illustrated in Figure 6). Fix
^ v. For all histories ht and "  0, dene

1
t(ht; ^ v + ") = 
eqm
t (ht; ^ v) + ":
Since the positive \direct eect" of higher joint outside option discussed earlier is at most "
and the \indirect eect" is always negative, 
1
t(ht; ^ v +") > 
eqm
t (ht; ^ v +"). Also, clearly,

1
t(ht;v) is right-continuous at v = ^ v for all histories ht.
As in Steps A-C of the algorithm illustrated in Figure 6, dene

1


























As argued above, the IC-constraint (35) is not (exactly) binding for any eort-prole at
a probability-one set of histories reached on the equilibrium path. At each such history,
F2
t (ht;v) is unchanging in a neighborhood of ^ v. Thus, the right-continuity of 
1
t(ht;et;v)
in v implies right-continuity of 
2
t(ht;v) in v, at a probability-one set of equilibrium
histories. Repeating this argument for all k  1, we conclude that 
k
t(ht;v) is right-
continuous in v at ^ v at a probability-one set of equilibrium histories. Such continuity
carries over to the limit as well, so that maximal equilibrium joint payo 
eqm
t (ht;v) is
right-continuous in v at a probability-one set of histories. In particular, E[
eqm
t (S0;v) is
right-continuous in v at ^ v. The proof of left-continuity is similar, and omitted to save
space.
Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. Part I: v   E[
eqm
0 (X0;v)] is strictly increasing in v. In a slight variation on the
notation used in the text, let 
eqm
t (ht;vh
) denote the maximal SPE joint payo from history
54ht = (xt;et 1) given joint outside option vh
. Consider now a lower joint outside option
vl
 2 [0;vh
) and let e t(ht;vl
) denote the joint payo that would result should players
with joint outside option vl
 mimic welfare-maximizing play as if it were vh
. Note that the
stage-game payo process and the partnership stopping time T are identically distributed
when players follow the same strategies. Thus, the only dierence in payos arises from the
fact that players only get vl
 when they survive but the partnership ends instead of vh
. In


























) denote the eorts played in the optimal SPE given joint outside option vh
.















































((37) follows from (36). (38) follows from the incentive-compatibility constraint (18) as ap-
plied to the optimal equilibrium given vh
.) By similar logic, staying is incentive-compatible
given these mimicking strategies whenever players stay in the optimal equilibrium given
joint outside option vh
. (Details omitted to save space.) Thus, these mimicking strate-
gies constitute a SPE given vl
. In particular, E[
eqm
0 (X0;vl














and we conclude that v E[
eqm
0 (X0;v)]
is non-decreasing in v. Since  < 1, this implies that v   E[
eqm
0 (X0;v)] is strictly in-
creasing in v.
Part II: v = E[
eqm
0 (X0;v)] has a unique solution v. (a) Given zero outside option,
each player's expected payo is non-negative in any SPE of the partnership game. In par-
ticular, 0  E[
eqm
0 (X0;0)]. (b) Since joint payos are bounded (Assumption 1), v 
E[
eqm
0 (X0;v)] for all large enough v. (c) By Part I and the proof of Theorem 5, v  
E[
eqm




55Proof of Claim 3
Proof. For all suciently small matching costs m, v(m) is implicitly dened by v(m) =
E[
eqm
0 (X0;v(m))] 2m. (Each player pays m  0 to start a new partnership having joint
outside option v(m). When m is suciently large, an active matching market cannot be
supported in equilibrium and v(m) = 0.) In Part I of the proof of Theorem 6, I show that
v  E[
eqm
0 (X0;v)] is strictly increasing in v. Thus, v(m) is strictly decreasing in m for
all small enough m.
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